Incentives of Small Countries to Participate in a Global Free Trade Agreement in Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis.
This article studies in particular the incentives of small countries such as Chile to deviate from a global free trade agreement in agriculture.
Year of Publication2011
During the last two decades a number of international rounds have been carried out with the objective of reaching a global free trade agreement in agriculture (GFTA). However, little progress has been made. A recent theoretical research based on the new literature on international trade networks revealed that the existing lack of agricultural liberalisation could equate to a structural problem under the assumption of identical countries in market size. The present article extends this new research to study in particular the incentives of small countries such as Chile to deviate from GFTA (i.e. when countries are asymmetric in market size).
This item is categorised as follows
Additional keywords/tagsinternational trade networkscompensatory paymentsagricultural trade liberalization
This is a brief summary of an item in the OpenFields Library. This free online library contains items of interest to practitioners and researchers in the agricultural and landbased industries.